Contents Preface: Why a multi disciplinary approach
The Semantics of Male Hair Valuation
The Significance of Cranio/Facial Appearance
Haircutting as a Function of Spirituality
Hair Allowance as a Function of Spirituality
Male Hair Denigration
Toward an Explanatory Theory
Table of Male Hair Law Cases
The reports of cases that address male hair law, identifiable as such, are found to have been published over a span of about thirty years. They number over two hundred and almost invariably reflect the inability of plaintiff men to satisfactorily impress the courts with the general importance of the ability of a man to exercise unfettered control over the presence of his hair.
It is important to note the following:
- Male hair regulations are invariably aimed toward requiring men to keep their cranial hair clipped short and their faces scraped clean, never the opposite.
- The shorn appearance against which the plaintiff so adamantly rebels is nearly always the image of choice of the deciding judge (or, in the case of a female jurist, her respected peers).
- If the plaintiff is represented by male counsel, the attorney will almost always present with short hair and will nearly as often stand in court with a scraped face.
Together, these demonstrate that the case law has very often been decided after bare faced, short haired counsel have presented pleadings to a judge of similar tonsorial persuasion for recognition of the importance to the integrity of a man to present with the facial hair that attests to his manhood and the cranial hair of one unbowed.
How sincere can the above described counsel appear to be? How is the judge to reconcile his own self-perception as a powerful, free male with the plaintiff's assertion that short hair is the mark of a slave and a face free of hair is only natural to the child or female?
If the judge is a woman, how can she appreciate the issues involved? If the plaintiff asserts that his unshorn head is the sign of his dedication to God over man, then what does this suggest regarding the religiosity of the judge himself or, in the case of a female jurist, her peers on the bench? Is their religion invalid, or is their discernment and/or adherence to its true precepts faulty? A consideration of these questions illuminates the jurist's personal conflicts that must be overcome if the plaintiff's case is to obtain an unbiased hearing.
If a plaintiff is to impress the court with the concept that a man's ability to control his own cranio/facial presentation should be considered a fundamental right of the highest magnitude, then he must be prepared to begin at the beginning. By using a multidisciplinary approach the attached paper seeks to allow the advocate in a male hair law case to do just that. By acknowledging the social-psychological, anthropological, historical, socio-political and spiritual/religious considerations the person who is to be persuaded is called to account for any tendency to discount, not just the position of the plaintiff, but also the positions of the cited authorities.
I do not intend that this paper be submitted simply as a supporting brief. It's highest and best use will be made when the advocate studies this presentation for the purpose of instilling a sort of mind set or attitude. That having been done, the references cited should be acquired and studied in the raw. At that point the advocate for male hair rights will be in good stead to develop the philosophical component of an appeal to the court.
This paper is intended to be a review of the literature followed by a theory that attempts to explain and reconcile apparent inconsistencies in our society's attitudes and practices regarding male hair. As a "review of the literature," it is not intended to serve as a comprehensive recapitulation of all that has been written on the subject of male hair significance. As stated earlier, the reader desirous of an in-depth study of the subject is well advised to treat the list of references as a directed reading list. Restrictions against male hair presence are so common and so firmly entrenched within our cultural mores that most of us take them for granted. We hardly consider the extent to which men must go to feel respected in modern American society.
Indeed, the man who is "dressed for success" has literally hidden every square inch of hair producing skin except for his hands, face and cranium. A man's hands produce only minimal amounts of hair and, at any rate, are easily ignored. The socially astute male removes his facial hair every morning and makes regular visits to a barber whom he pays to cut his cranial hair to a length that is typically no longer than about three inches on top and tapers to nothing over the ears and shirt collar.
When we see a bare faced, five year-old boy with short, greased down hair we comment on how he looks so much the part of the "little man." If we acknowledge, however, that facial hair is natural to the adult male's face, and that short hair is a classic sign of subservience, we see that it would be more appropriate to comment on how the typically presented business man has so much the look of a little boy.
As a society, we superficially appear to believe that male, cranio/facial hair presentation is a matter of de minimus import. One author titled his otherwise scholarly writing on a sub topic of the subject "Suits for the Hirsute...". (Maloney, 1995) In his first footnote (at pg. 1243) he thanks his wife for suggesting that title as an alternative to his first choice of "Hair Today, Gone Tomorrow."
We may well doubt that a male orthodox Jew or Sunni Muslim, who has had to make a choice between forgoing life sustaining employment or shaving his face in defiance of the spiritual tenets in which he believes, could appreciate the humor of either title.
Another author (Kentsmith, 1973) begins his journal article on the significance of hair with a quote from the poem The Rape of the Lock by Alexander Pope; to-wit "What mighty contests rise from trivial things." Thus, he makes his sentiments on the subject evident beyond peradventure.
Consider these three perspectives on the value of male hair:
- the individual man's valuation of his own hair presentation,
- ostensible societal expectations of what constitutes the cranio/facial presentation of a good man,
- true societal preferences in male hair presentation as uncovered by research performed in the discipline of social-psychology.
If (a), (b) and (c) were in accord with one another, there would be little to discuss. Individual men place great value on their own hair as habitually presented, and social-psych research shows that we hold bearded men in more positive regard than bare-faced men. Further, we see long-haired men as being dominant and unbowed, (Kentshmith, 1973 at pg. 579) and religious prohibitions against haircutting and/or shaving are not uncommon among the world's religions.
Yet, on the more practical level, we largely demand that men present with bare faces and shorn cranial hair if they are to obtain life sustaining employment and are to be presumed good, productive members of society; therein lies the proverbial rub.
This paper seeks to provide a review of the literature that relates to the significance of the cranio-facial hair presentation of the adult male, as well as to put forth a theory that explains those incongruencies in our social position on male hair described above. Alfred Korzybski, a highly respected theorist in the field of general semantics, held that language is much more than a system of symbols used to communicate reality in the manner of a photograph, for example. (Hayakawa, 1954 at pg. viii) Rather he felt our words and phrases carry assumptions about the characteristics of our existence that forcefully direct, if not dictate, our thoughts (Hayakawa, 1954 at pg. viii) and behaviors. (Hayakawa, 1954 at pg. 20)
In keeping with these ideas, when we speak of a man's hair we do well to examine our words carefully to be truly cognizant of the notions those words connote within our minds.
Do we speak of requiring a man to get a "haircut" if, for example, he is to be considered a good prisoner, soldier, or worker, or should we admit that we are requiring him to "cut off a bodily appendage"?
Do we say that a man can make an affirmative decision to "grow a beard," much as the expert, dedicated horticulturist can grow petunias in the desert? Or do we say that male facial hair growth is the default category and acknowledge that men can only become and remain bare faced when they "scrape off their faces with a piece of steel" on a daily basis?
Our common use of such terms and phrases as "haircut" and "grows a beard" clearly points up the fundamental, societal bias we have against acknowledging positive value in men's hair.
One of the ways we denigrate male hair growth is to implicitly deny that the hair we deem to be extra is a part of a man's body. We commonly say that a man with facial hair "wears" a beard, mustache, etc., reducing the import of his facial hair to that of a piece of clothing.
We never say that a man "wears hair" if the subject cuts his cranial hair relatively short, but if he refrains from hair cutting we say that he "wears long hair." The clear implication is that a certain amount of cranial hair is socially desirable, indeed almost necessary, while anything more than a moderate hair presence is surplusage.
It's interesting to compare the process involved in this semantic denigration to that of the social-psychological process of depersonalization, the classic examples of which are the Vietnam era soldiers who found it easier to carry out their orders while thinking in terms of "offing gooks" rather than killing Vietnamese people. In a similar vein, we find it easier to require a male employee, prisoner or serviceman to remain short haired if we couch our edict in terms of getting a "haircut" (The term itself begs the question, "Which one should he cut?) as opposed to explicitly ordering him to go and have someone cut off his hair.
The word beard is used in at least two different ways in that, first, we might say that a man has a beard that is heavy or light, even though no hair presence is visible. In this case, we use the phrase (e.g. heavy beard) to refer to the density, and propensity for development, of a man's facial hair follicles. In the second sense, used much more often, we use the word beard to refer to the natural, unmolested presence of facial hair. The latter usage is arguably invalid in that it implicitly denies the permanent and natural reality of male facial hair. The better view holds that, in fact, even if a man shaves daily, he still has a beard. He cannot take it off and discard it like an offensive coat or scarf.
With this definitional shift, we acknowledge that all normal, healthy men have beards throughout their adult lives. The only question is whether they'll scrape off the visible evidence every morning.
In shaving, a man reduces himself to the status of being "clean shaven," to use a phrase that is firmly ensconced within our lexicon. The corollary, of course, would be to remain "dirty bearded." The phrase "clean cut" takes this concept a step further and implies that if a man does not cut his cranial hair to a short length and scrape his face daily, then he is unclean.
Classically, of course, it's believed that that which is unclean should be shunned. For what it's worth, we note that the term "young shaver" is used to refer to an immature male of no status, and that "shave tail" is a derogatory term used to refer to an inexperienced army officer. (Webster's, 1979 at pg. 1058) The phrase shave tail was derived from the practice of shaving the tail of a newly broken mule to differentiate it from untrained ones. (Webster's, 1979 at pg. 1058) The Freudian implications are obvious.
Those who would deride the presence of long hair on men often refer to same as being part and parcel of an "unkempt" appearance. It's interesting to note that the word unkempt means uncombed. (Webster's, 1979 at 1271) Thus, he who keeps his hair in the style of a short crew-cut is, under the denotative use of the word, unkempt. In truth, though, the word unkempt is a superfluous pejorative used to describe a long-haired or bearded man about whom we disapprove.
To understand our society's mixed feelings on the valuation of male hair, it is helpful to review the literature of the disciplines of anthropology, psychology, theology, and history and to specifically examine some reasons why men have engaged in hair cutting over the ages. The human head, as viewed from the front, is the area of our bodies that is most important in influencing and regulating interpersonal conduct. (Liggett, 1974 generally; Macgregor, 1974 at pg. 25) It is the bodily area most associated with individual identity (Alley, 1988 at pgs. 1 & 192) and it communicates to the other, instantaneously, information as to the age and gender of the bearer which has, in turn, a major influence on social interaction. (Alley, 1988 at pg. 1) Because our facial presentation affects how we perceive ourselves, it can be expected to have a bearing on how we behave whenever others are present. (Alley, 1988 at pg. 2)
More specifically, the presentation of cranio/facial hair is arguably our most powerful symbol of individual and group identity. (Synnott, 1987 at pg. 381) Hair has been significant to human beings at all times and in all cultures as a symbol of strength, sexuality and magic and has been treated as a significant part of the body. (Rabinowitz, 1984 at pg. 270) Hair not only symbolizes the self, but is the self in that it is a part of the human body. (Synnott, 1987 at pg. 404) Accordingly, changes in appearance involving hair can be expected to have a major psycho-social impact on the individual who has undergone the change. (Alley, 1988 at pg. 17)
Through cranio-facial hair presentation, people symbolize their identities with respect to a wide range of phenomena: religious, political, sexual, social, occupational and others. (Synnott, 1987 at pg. 405)
Males express their ideologies and status in their hair. (Synnott, 1987 at pg. 397) In ancient times, the Teutons or Germanic tribes refrained from hair cutting and shaving in order to clearly differentiate themselves from their forcibly shorn slaves. (Pellegrini, 1973 at pg. 22) This was also the case for the Celts. In this day, long hair and facial hair are often seen to be symbolic of ideological opposition to "the establishment." (Synnott, 1987 at pg. 401) The allowance of facial hair by the male represents his manhood in that it differentiates him from females and children. (Synnott, 1987 at pg. 390)
People commonly make arational personality attributions, such as those relating to intelligence, personality, and criminality, based simply on facial appearance. (Roll & Verinis, 1971 at pg. 975) Cutting the hair is seen to indicate submitting to social control, whereas from long hair we infer an intent to remain outside society. (Hallpike, 1969 at pg. 261)
Beards typically increase perceptions by others of the bearded person's intelligence, likeableness, health, popularity, sensitivity to others, and sexual appeal (Pellegrini, 1973; Sprecher et al, 1984 at 227ff) as well as enthusiasm, sincerity, generosity, inquisitiveness and dirtiness. (Kenny & Fletcher, 1973) Bearded men are also seen as more mature, self-confident, liberal, nonconformist and industrious. (Pellegrini, 1973 at pg. 30) Research has shown that women find bearded men more appealing and other men ascribe to them more status, other factors being supportive. (Freedman, 1969) Other research shows that both young and middle aged men are seen as better looking when bearded. (Sprecher et al, 1984 at pg. 227ff)
A protrusive or jutting chin is stereotypically believed to suggest energy, strength of will, ambition, and determination (Bellak & Baker, 1981 at pg. 86ff; Cohen, 1973 at pg. 143; Gurnee, 1936 at pg. 182) and research suggests that male facial hair serves to increase the apparent mass of the lower face. (Guthrie, 1970 at pg. 362ff; Guthrie, 1976 at pg. 25ff) This suggests that the presentation of a beard or goatee may be seen as relatively intimidating by others. Indeed, beards have been shown to increase attributions of courageousness and dominance made toward the hirsute male (Pellegrini, 1973 at pg. 30) as well as perceptions by others of his apparent masculinity and strength. (Kenny & Fletcher, 1973); Pellegrini, 1973 at pg. 30; Pancer & Meindl, 1978)
Note that the word beard may be used as a verb, in which case it means inter alia to resolutely and openly oppose with effrontery or daring, and/or to defiantly thwart. (Simpson & Weiner, 1989) The relatively voluntary cutting of one's own hair has often been related to spiritual expression. Looking back through history, we see that upon reaching manhood Greek youths sacrificed their hair to the river, a quasi-spiritual entity in their view. (Menninger, 1938) In ancient Rome, as well as Arabia and Syria, haircutting was a puberty ritual, with spiritual significance. (Menninger, 1938) Ancient Egyptian travelers didn't cut their hair until they returned from a journey, at which time the cut hair was given as an offering to God. (Rabinowitz, 1984) Mourners in many different cultures give hair offerings that are believed to substitute for the sacrifice of the mourner's whole person. (Rabinowitz, 1984) And shaving the head is found in many faiths and cultures as a symbol of dedication to God; e.g., ancient Buddhism, Hinduism, and among the Yoruba. (Leach, 1958 at pg. 155; Derrett, 1973 at pg. 101; Hershman, 1974 at pg. 276; Houlberg, 1979 at pg. 367ff)
The Judeo-Christian religious practices have also taken a pointed interest in male hair.
The Roman Catholic or Eastern rite of admission to the clerical state by clipping or shaving the head of monks or other clerics or renunciants provides yet another example. (Rom, 1973 at pg. 24) The Christian Apostle Paul, in his letter to the Corinthians indicates that it is unnatural and degrading for a man to wear long hair. (Paul, 60) Through Canon #67, laid down at the Synod at Elvira in 309 A.D., it was forbidden for a woman to have anything to do with long-haired men, under penalty of excommunication. (Laeuchli, 1972) Thus, any man desirous of recognition as a good Christian, as well as one simply seeking the consortium of a religiously respectable Christian woman, was provided with a motivation to cut his hair.
In the Israelite tradition, when Jews were bearded, mourning the dead was symbolized by shaving the beard. (see "Jeremiah...; Morgenstern, 1966 at pg. 105) Today, among conservative (unbearded) Jews, mourning is sometimes symbolized by not shaving, but the traditional Semite practice indicates sacrificing cranio/facial hair during mourning periods. (Morgenstern, 1966 at pg. 105) The account, from the Judeo-Christian scriptures, of Samson and Delilah is well known in our American society, though the importance to that account of the Vow of the Nazirite is not. The Vow of the Nazirite is found in the book of Numbers, chapter six. This book is held to be high scripture by the Jewish practitioner inasmuch as it is one of the five books of Torah. The Christian worshipper holds this book sacred, though of less central import, as one of the over sixty books of the Holy Christian Bible.
Per this scriptural directive, a man may become identified as one who is maximally dedicated to God by, among other requirements, refraining from cutting any of his cranio-facial hair. The commitment is not to be taken lightly, as is indicated by the involved ritual prescribed for performance at the completion of the vow. Further, the account of Samson indicates that the taking of the Vow is not necessarily to be presumed to be temporary in nature in that Samson's mother was instructed to raise him as a Nazirite from birth, and that he was to remain so until his death. (Judges 13:2-7) The Rastafarian practitioner may cite the Vow of the Nazirite as the basis for his abstention from hair cutting, as do many orthodox Jewish men and some Christians. Leviticus 21:5, however, is just as authoritative and is, per at least one researcher, the citation of choice of the Rastafarian. (Taylor, 1984 at pg. 1608) Other men have presented as having taken the Vow of the Nazirite who claim a generic worship of God aside from any adherence to Judaism, Rastafarianism, and/or the worship of God through Jesus.
Among Jewish men, a more common citation offered as justification for the refusal to shave or trim facial hair is that of Leviticus 19:27 which directs that "You shall not destroy the corners of your beard." Deuteronomy 14:1 is also supportive of the value of a natural hair presentation for he who would aspire to Godliness. Leviticus and Deuteronomy are both found in Torah which, as mentioned earlier, renders them to be high scripture for the Jewish practitioner and scripture of moderate import for the Christian. Rastafarians also commonly revere Torah.
Many Sunni Muslims believe that male practitioners are scripturally enjoined to present with a "full flowing" beard. They cite passages from the Koran, as well as the interpretations of those scriptures made by respected Islamic theologians. (Furqan, 1982) It may be appropriate at this juncture to note the significance of the Muslim faith to so many African-Americans. On a more practical plane, it's estimated that about 25% of African-American men suffer from the condition know as pseudo folliculitis barbe, which leads to painful, disfiguring skin infections as a result of shaving. Further, the historical and ongoing socio-economic oppression faced by these men hardly needs supporting references. With these three points in mind, it can perhaps be better appreciated what an affront it must be to be ordered to scrape off the outer layer of one's faith everyday as an African-American man who practices the Sunnite path of Islam.
The people to which we refer with the phrase "Native Americans" comprise, in fact, many different tribes each of which has its own, individual mores, social characteristics and spiritual beliefs. Only superficially can we lump them together for discussion of their spiritual practices. That having been admitted, I will, nevertheless, submit that many Native Americans believe that a man's vitality and strength reside in his hair (Kentshmith, 1973 at pg. 576) and that his hair is a gift from the Creator, to be cut only when someone close to them dies. (Hamilton, 1996)
Sikhism is a religion that, worldwide, is practiced by approximately as many people as is Judaism. The last in its succession of ten Gurus, Gobind Singh, directed that male practitioners were to refrain from any form of hair cutting. (Cole & Sambhi, 1978 at pg. 36) The Guru's rationale is believed to have been that haircutting was unnatural and, hence, unGodly. (Cole & Sambhi, 1978 at pg. 111) Additionally, it's believed that he intended for the appearance generated by the ongoing practice of abstention from haircutting to enhance solidarity and religious loyalty among Sikhs. (Cole & Sambhi, 1978) Though the Sikh who cuts his hair is never an outcast, he is clearly differentiated from those who "keep the five Ks", one of which relates to uncut cranial and facial hair. Military regimes across time and cultures have been well known to require the removal of cranio/facial hair for initiates. For example, new members of the French Foreign Legion had their hair cut down to half a millimeter; allegedly to keep them free from lice - in reality to bestow on them a feeling of nothingness. (Rom, 1973 at pg. 22) When after their basic military training they felt integrated into this establishment, they were allowed to grow their hair again. (Rom, 1973 at pg. 22) Upon subduing the Gauls, who esteemed long hair as a distinct honor, Julius Caesar required them to cut their hair as a token of submission. (Kentsmith, 1973 at pg. 573) For the same purpose, the Chinese Manchus imposed the partly shaven head and pigtail upon the Haun men when their dynasty was conquered. (Kentsmith, 1973 at pg. 573) Forced hair removal was effected against collaborators during the German occupation of France. (Synnott, 1987 at pg. 402) Haircutting was a punishment for adultery in India and among the ancient Teutons, and for other crimes in Assyro-Babylon. (Rabinowitz, 1984 at pg. 271)
Why do those in authority want men to shave their faces and cut their cranial hair short? It has been posited that the hair of prison inmates and soldiers is kept cut as a reminder that "you are not a free person and cannot do as you please with your own body." (Rabinowitz, 1984) Shaving produces effects like other means of fostering a youthful appearance because a "clean-shaven" face mimics the surface quality of the pre-pubertal face. (Guthrie, 1976 at pg. 30) Therefore, requiring a man to shave can have the effect of reducing his status, and his self-perception, toward that of a child. Moreover, we live in a world that has, cross-culturally and over time, viewed men collectively as being cold, aggressive, strong willed, and dangerous. (Martin, 1987; Rosenkrantz et al, 1968; Broverman et al, 1972) Women as a class, on the other hand, have been generally presumed to be warm, submissive, obedient and nurturing. (Martin, 1987; Rosenkrantz et al, 1968; Broverman et al, 1972; Sapadin, 1988) Forcing or coercing a man into daily shaving can be seen as assigning to him the less threatening, feminine role. Most to the point, and as stated earlier, because our facial presentation effects how we perceive ourselves, it can be expected to have a bearing on how we behave whenever others are present. (Alley, 1988 at pg. 2) The man, then, who presents as quasi-boy / pseudo-woman can be expected to act in the submissive, obedient, non-threatening manner that we stereotypically expect of little boys and females.
As to the significance of cutting a man's cranial hair, numerous investigators have agreed on one symbolic meaning: castration. (Andresen, 1980 at pg. 80; Freud, 1913; Berg, 1936; Kentsmith, 1973 at pg. 576) The forced removal of another's hair can also be seen as a manifestation of the extraction of reparations. (Andresen, 1980; Morgenstern, 1966 at pg. 84) Put more simply, cranial hair removal is intended to make the male an un-man and, in the case of the judicial prisoner, to obtain vengeance or pay-back for wrongs committed.
But how do we account for the men, non-military and unconvicted, who voluntarily maintain their hair at a short length and who shave on a daily basis? First, we must acknowledge that hair removal can hardly be considered voluntary in a society where generating a monetary income and positive regard among one's peers are generally dependent upon it. That having been said, we note simply that people will normally succumb to within-group cultural pressures to conform to an appearance expectation, even at a cost of discomfort or disfigurement. (Jenny, 1975; Darwin, 1871) Examples found within non-European cultures include the wearing of lipdiscs, neck elongation, head molding and scarring. (Jenny, 1975; Darwin, 1871) In America today, we note the purchase of cosmetically based orthodonture, liposuction, and the subcutaneous insertion of pads designed to increase the apparent size of male muscleculture or female breasts. Dr. Karl Menninger, the eminent theorist, argues for the placement of male hair cutting in the same class as the aforementioned forms of bodily mutilation. (Menninger, 1938) All are arational and involve expenditures of money, time and/or the sufferance of pain that are not inconsequential. All involve processes that are tolerated at the behest of dominant social forces by which those who submit are coerced.
As to he who is "his own man" and who yet chooses to shave his face and shear his scalp in the absence of any explicit coercion or force, perhaps the best explanation of motive is found in the word inertia. An anecdote (Fadiman, 1985) is told of George Bernard Shaw that relates the time he was approached by an advertising executive of a company manufacturing electric razors. The executive had hoped that Shaw would endorse their new product by shaving off his beard. By way of reply, Shaw explained the reason why he, and his father before him, had chosen not to shave by saying that when he was about five years of age, he had been observing his father shaving one day and had said to him, "Daddy, why do you shave?" Shaw's father looked at him in silence for a full minute before throwing the razor out the window while exclaiming "Why the hell do I?" And he never did again, as the story goes. Accepting that which has been thus far presented, we find that male hair maintenance involves issues of the highest personal significance. We see that the world's religions commonly take notice of men's hair maintenance practices. They often proscribe the cutting of cranial and/or facial hair. In a very few cases cranial haircutting is religiously directed, but facial hair removal is only rarely suggested, and the scriptural citations applying thereto offer only weak, tangential support for same. The academic, social-science research is largely in accord in holding that bearded men are held in more positive regard than those with shaved faces. The view that the long haired male is unbowed is one that might be supposed to be as valued by modern day men as it was by the ancient Teutons and Celts. Many of the world's most commonly and highly revered religious human entities (including those respected as direct manifestations of God, as well those held to be bona fide prophets) are envisioned with unshorn hair. Many of our most highly respected men of non-religious, historical import are known to have been bearded and with relatively long hair. Yet today, the majority of our society's men shave daily and keep their cranial hair clipped short. In what theory do we find the reconciliation of these facts?
Law officers and military men have long been associated with the personality traits of reliability and obedience as well as the appearance characteristics of scraped faces and short-clipped cranial hair. In the consequently proffered correlation, then, we find our first agent of reinforcement for the idea that short haired, bare faced men are good and proper. More significantly, though, the expectation of short hair and scraped faces on men has long since been the norm for this nation's employers in general. In holding the clipped male to be the preferred object of our workplace desire we show, not so much our disinterest in females in our society, but rather our particular interest in submissive men as producers of material benefit. We, as a society, prefer men in the workplace because we perceive men, as a class, to be more dedicated to employment activities to the detriment of their familial or other inter-personal relationships. (Rosenkrantz et al, 1968; Broverman et al, 1972) Further, we see them as being more dependable than females in that we expect them to be medically indisposed less often. But we also presume that men in general are domineering, willful and aggressive by nature, and these are clearly characteristics that are found to be dysfunctional in a production level employee. (Martin, 1987; Rosenkrantz et al, 1968; Broverman et al, 1972) Women, on the other hand, are stereotypically presumed to be more docile, more amenable to following orders and accepting authority in an unquestioning manner. (Martin, 1987; Rosenkrantz et al, 1968; Broverman et al, 1972; Gilligan, 1982 at pgs. 16 & 17, e.g.)
The clipped male seems to present the best of both genders in that, first, he is obviously a man and so brings to the employer the supposed dependability and dedication that we expect of a member of the male sex. Second, by scraping off his facial hair he communicates to the employer that he intends to be as docile and obedient as would a female be presumed to be. (The validity of this hypothesis is lent support by so many of today's business women inasmuch as they are careful to appear for job interviews in clothing that is masculine on top, shirt-like blouse and suit jacket, but feminine on the bottom with a skirt short enough to expose artificially hairless legs.) The cutting short of cranial hair is a further sign of male submission to, and emasculation before, the prospective employer; one needn't be a Freudian psychoanalyst to appreciate the import of the fact that the removal of cranial hair, as symbolic penectomy, has never been required of women by our society's employers, prison wardens, or military authorities.
As short hair and bare faces have become more and more common on working class men, a distinction has emerged supporting the presumption that those men who are unshorn are either unproductive or, far less likely, are independently wealthy or of an advanced professional position. An example of the latter would be the high level academic. The fact that his uncut hair and unshaven face are truly indicative of his elevated social position will be of small consolation when the college professor is treated like a socio-economic no-account as he moves about casually in public social settings. Similarly, the long haired wealthy male who is frequently harassed by law enforcement personnel may soon tire of expressing his supposed freedom from the oppressive hair regulations of the typical employer through his unshorn hair. Those in power have required their man-servants to emasculate themselves through cranio-facial hair removal as a demonstration of their submissiveness. As this pseudo-feminine appearance has become more and more associated with respected and valued male participation in the national economy, the powered males have become motivated to emulate the very appearance of subservience from which members of their class had historically sought disassociation. As a result, we find ourselves in a society where men commonly, and unthinkingly, deny both their manhood and personal autonomy by daily face scraping and cranial hair mutilation. (A man's quasi-voluntary submission to social dictates cannot rationally be seen to vitiate the position that our society's male hair expectations are unacceptably oppressive.) Those few men remaining who have the wherewithal to present with uncompromised facial and cranial hair can be recognized as being relatively masterful of their own lives and valued as such, but only if they are able to otherwise indicate a high socio-economic status.
Alley, T. R. (Ed.). (1988). Social and applied aspects of perceiving faces. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers.
Andresen, J. J. (1980). Rapunzel: The symbolism of the cutting of hair. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association Vol. 28(1), 69-88.
Bellak, L., & Baker, S. S. (1981). Reading faces. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
Berg, C. (1936). The unconscious significance of hair. International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 17, 73-88.
Broverman et al. (1972). Sex role stereotypes: A current appraisal. Journal of Social Issues, 28, 59-78.
Cohen, R. (1973). Patterns of personality judgment. New York: Academic Press.
Cole, W. O., & Sambhi, P. S. (1978). The Sikhs: Their religious beliefs and practices. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Darwin, C. R. (1871). The descent of man and selection in relation to sex. London: John Murray. as reported by Alley, T. R. (Ed.) (1988). Social and applied aspects of perceiving faces at page 193. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers. (Alley doesn't indicate the page in Darwin's two volume presentation at which Darwin makes the supportive statement.)
Derrett, D. M. (1973). Religious hair. Man, 8, 100-103.
Eagly, A. H. (1987). Sex differences in social behavior: A social role interpretation. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.
Fadiman, C. (Ed.) (1985). The Little, Brown book of anecdotes. (p. 500). Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company.
Freedman, D. G. (1969). The survival value of the beard. Psychology Today, 3(5), 36-39.
Freud, S. (1913). Leonardo da Vinci and a memory of his childhood. Standard Edition, 11, 57-137.
see Furqan v. Georgia State Bd. of Offender Rehabilitation, 554 F. Supp. 873 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
Gilligan, C. (1982). In a different voice: Psychological theory and women's development. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Gonzalez, J. (1966). Long hair and adolescence. Louisiana Psychiatric Association, 6(3), 3. as reported by Kentsmith, D. K. (1973). The rape of the lock revisited. Psychiatric Quarterly, 47(4), 571-585, 573.
Gurnee, H. (1936). Elements of social psychology. New York: Farrar & Reinhart.
Guthrie, R. D. (1976). Body hot spots. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold.
Guthrie, R. D. (1970). Evolution of human threat display organs. as reported by Dobzhansky, T., Hecht, M. K., & Steere, W. C. (Eds.). Evolutionary biology, (4th ed.). 257-302. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Hallpike, C. R. (1987). Hair. as reported by Eliade, M. (Ed.). The Encyclopaedia of Religion, 6, 154-157. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company.
Hallpike, C. R. (1969). Social hair, Man, 4, 256-264.
Hastings, J. (Ed.). (1951). Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, 5, 474477. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
Hayakawa, S. I. (Ed.). (1954). Language, meaning and maturity. New York: Harper and Brothers.
Hershman, P. (1974). Hair, sex and dirt. Man, 9, 274-298.
Houlberg, M. H. (1979). Social hair: Tradition and change in Yoruba hairstyles in southwestern Nigeria. Cordwell, J. M., & Schwarz, R. A. (Eds.). The Fabrics of Culture. (pp. 349-397). The Hague: Mouton Press.
Jenny, J. (1975). A social perspective on need and demand for orthodontic treatment. International Dental Journal, 25, 248-256, 248.
Jeremiah 7:29, 41:5 and Ezra 9:3 are seen by some as being suggestive of the propriety of hair removal during periods of mourning, but they can also be interpreted as mere historical accounts of the actions of the shamed. Moreover, compare Deuteronomy 14:1.
Kenny, C. T., & Fletcher, D. (1973). Effects of beardedness on person perception. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 37, 413-414.
Kentsmith, D. K. (1973). The rape of the lock revisited. Psychiatric Quarterly, 47(4), 571-585.
Knight, G. P., & Dubro, A. F. (1984). Cooperative, competitive and individualistic social values: An individualized regression and clustering approach. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 46, 98-105.
Laeuchli, S. (1972). Power and sexuality. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Leach, E. A. (1958). Magical hair. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 88(II), 147-164.
Liggett, J. (1974). The human face. London: Constable.
Macgregor, F. C. (1974). Transformation and identity. New York: Quadrangle.
Maloney, James M. (1995). Suits for the hirsute: Defending against America's undeclared war of beards in the workplace. Fordham Law Review, 63, 1203-1244.
Martin, C. L. (1987). A ratio measure of sex stereotyping. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52, 489-499.
Menninger, K. (1938). Man against himself. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.
Morgenstern, J. (1966). Rites of birth, marriage death and kindred occasions among the Semites. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, Inc.
Pancer, S. M., & Meindl, J. R. (1978). Length of hair and beardedness as determinants of personality impressions. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 46, 1328-1330.
Paul (approx. 60 A.D.) 1 Corinthians 11:14
Pellegrini, R. J. (1973). Impressions of the male personality as a function of beardedness. Psychology, 10, 29-33.
Rabinowitz, J. (1984). The haircut: Its meaning in childhood. Child and Adolescent Social Work Journal, 1(4), 270-279.
Roll S., & Verinis, J. S. (1971). Stereotypes of scalp and facial hair as measured by the semantic differential. Psychological Reports, 28, 975-980.
Rom, P. (1973). Hair style and life style. Individual Psychologist, 10(2), 22-25.
Rosenkrantz et al. (1968). Sex-role stereotypes and self-concepts in college students. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 32, 287-295.
Sapadin, L. A. (1988). Friendship and gender: Perspectives of professional men and women. Journal of Social and Personal Relationships, 5, 387-403.
Simpson, J. A., & Weiner, E. S. C. (Eds.). (1989). The Oxford English dictionary, (2nd ed.). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Sprecher et al. (1984). as reported by Hatfield, E., & Sprecher, S. (1986). Mirror, mirror: The importance of looks in everyday life, 227ff. Albany, NY: State University of New York.
Synnott, A. (1987). Shame and glory: a sociology of hair. The British Journal of Sociology, 38(3), 381-413.
Taylor, T. B. (1984). Soul rebels: The Rastafarians and the free exercise clause. The Georgetown Law Journal, 72, 1605-1635.
Woolf, H. B. et al. (Eds.). (1979). Webster's new collegiate dictionary. Springfield, MA: G. & C. Merriam Company.
Male Hair Law Case Names
The immediately following, organized list of case names is intended to include each case that relates to restrictions placed upon the growth of men's hair that has been addressed by any court, state or federal, and that has resulted in a published case report - other than those that relate to pre- or post-conviction governmental detention. Next following is the list of case names for cases that relate to the jail and prison settings. The holdings and/or dicta in these cases will be of value to a plaintiff in the preparation of his argument for the legal invalidity of the restrictive hair regulations that bear upon him.
1st Circuit Collegiate
Lucia v. Duggan, 303 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1969). 5th Circuit
Conard v. Goolsby, 350 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Miss. 1972). 9th Circuit
Finot v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 250 Cal. App.2d 189 (1967). 11th Circuit
Ramsey v. Hopkins, 320 F. Supp. 477 (N.D. Ala. 1970).
Hander v. San Jacinto Junior College, 519 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1975).
Public Safety Emergency Medical Technician
11th Circuit Firefighter
Rafford v. Randle E. Ambulance Serv., Inc. 348 F. Supp. 316 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
DC 2nd Circuit
Kennedy v. District of Columbia, 654 A.2d 847 (D.C. 1994).
Kamerling v. O'Hagan, 512 F.2d 443 (2nd Cir. 1975). 3rd Circuit
Elko v. McCarey, 315 F. Supp. 886 (E.D. Penn. 1970). 11th Circuit
Lindquist v. City of Coral Gables, 323 F. Supp. 1161 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
Yarbrough v. City of Jacksonville, 363 F. Supp. 1176 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
Law Enforcement Police
Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976). DC Circuit
Marshall v. District of Columbia, 392 F. Supp. 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 1st Circuit
MA 2nd Circuit
Bd. of Selectmen v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 387 N.E.2d 1198 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979).
Dwen v. Barry, 483 F.2d 1126 (2nd Cir. 1973). NY
Greenwald v. Frank, 70 Misc.2d 632, 334 N.Y.S.2d 680 (1972). 8th Circuit
Greenwald v. Frank, 47 A.D.2d 628, 363 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1975).
Stradley v. Andersen, 349 F. Supp. 1120 (D. Neb.1972). 11th Circuit
Ashley v. City of Macon, Georgia, et al., 377 F. Supp. 540 (M.D. Ga. 1974). 9th Circuit
Burback v. Goldschmidt, 521 P.2d 5 (Or. App. 1974).
2nd Circuit Miscellaneous
Rourke v. New York State, 915 F. Supp. 525 (N.D.N.Y. 1995). 6th Circuit
Rourke v. New York State, 615 N.Y.S.2d 470 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
Rourke v. New York State, 603 N.Y.S.2d 647 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994).
Blanken v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. and Corr., 944 F. Supp. 1359 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
DC Circuit Detention
Brown v. D. C. Transit Sys., Inc., 523 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 6th Circuit
OH 9th Circuit
Schneider v. Ohio Youth Comm'n, 287 N.E.2d 633 (Ohio Ct. App. 1972).
OR 10th Circuit
Brookes v. Tri-County Metro. Transp. Dist., 526 P.2d 590 (Or. Ct. App. 1974).
Chiappe v. State Personnel Bd., 622 P.2d 527 (Colo. 1981).
Pre-trial detention (jail) (see separate listing, following)
Post trial detention (prison) (see separate listing, following)
New Rider v. Bd. of Educ., 414 U.S. 1097 (1973). 1st Circuit
Richards, Jr. v. Thurston, 304 F. Supp. 449 (D. Mass. 1969). 3rd Circuit
Richards, Jr. v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970).
Martin v. Davison, 322 F. Supp. 318 (W.D. Penn. 1971). 5th Circuit
TX 6th Circuit
Barber v. Colorado Indep. Sch. Dist., 901 S.W.2d 447 (Tex. 1995).
Toungate v. Bastrop Indep. Sch. Dist., 842 S.W.2d 823 (Tex. App. 1992).
Bastrop Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Toungate, 922 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. App. 1996).
OH 7th Circuit
Royer v. Bd. of Educ., 365 N.E.2d 889 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977).
Breen v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702 (W.D. Wisc. 1969). 8th Circuit
Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969).
Crews v. Cloncs, 303 F. Supp. 1370 (S.D. Ind. 1969).
Crews v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1970).
Arnold v. Carpenter, 459 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1972).
Holsapple v. Woods, 500 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1974).
Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1971). 9th Circuit
Torvik v. Decorah Community Schools, 453 F.2d 779 (8th Cir. 1972).
AK 11th Circuit
Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159 (Alaska 1972).
Jeffers v. Yuba City Unified, Sch. District, 319 F. Supp. 368 (E.D. Cal. 1970).
Murphy v. Pocatello Sch. Dist. #25, 480 P.2d 878 (Idaho 1971).
Griffin v. Tatum, 300 F. Supp. 60 (M.D. Ala. 1969).
Dawson v. Hillsborough Sch. Bd., 322 F. Supp. 286 (M.D. Fla. 1971).
5th Circuit Military
Lansdale v. Tyler Junior College, 470 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1972). 8th Circuit
Reichenberg v. Nelson, 310 F. Supp. 248 (D. Neb. 1970).
Brown v. Schlesinger, 365 F. Supp. 1204 (E.D. Va. 1973). 5th Circuit
Talley v. McLucas, 366 F. Supp. 1241 (N.D. Tex. 1973). 9th Circuit
Khalsa v. Weinberger, 787 F.2d 1288 (9th Cir. 1985).
In General Trespass Law
9th Circuit UE Compensation
Cox, 474 P.2d 992 (Cal. 1970).
10th Circuit Motorcycle Helmet Laws
CO 11th Circuit
Engraff v. Industrial Comm'n, 678 P.2d 564 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983).
FL 9th Circuit
Advanced Mobile Home Sys., Inc. v. Unemp. Appeals Comm'n, 663 So.2d 1382 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
Chambers v. California Unemp. Ins. Appeals Bd., 33 Cal. App.3d 923 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973).
9th Circuit Immigration
Buhl v. Hannigan, 16 Cal. App. 4th 1612 (1993).
Singh v. INS, 107 F.3d 17 (9th Cir. 1997). (Unpublished Disposition).
Non Governmental Settings
Boyce v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 402 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 1st Circuit
Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Fagan v. National Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
NH 2nd Circuit
Planchet v. New Hampshire Hosp., 341 A.2d 267 (N.H. 1975).
Longo v. Carlisle DeCoppet & Co., 403 F.Supp 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 3rd Circuit
Longo v. Carlisle DeCoppet & Co., 537 F.2d 685 (2nd Cir. 1976).
Tavora v. New York Mercantile Exchange, 101 F.3d 907 (2nd Cir. 1996).
Pik-Wik Stores, Inc. v. Comm'n on Human Rights and Opportunities, 365 A.2d 1210 (Conn. 1976).
Page Airways of Albany, Inc., 376 N.Y.S.2d 32 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975).
Dripps v. UPS of Penn., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 421 (W.D. Penn. 1974). 4th Circuit
Syrek v. Pennsylvania Air Nat'l Guard, 537 F.2d 66 (3rd Cir.1976).
Earwood v. Continental SE. Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir. 1976). 5th Circuit
Kohli v. Looc, Inc., 654 A.2d 922 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995).
Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'g Co., 482 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1973). 6th Circuit
Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'g Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir.1975).
McConnell v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank at Dallas, 389 F. Supp. 594 (N.D. Tex. 1975).
Morris v. Texas and Pac. Ry. Co., 387 F. Supp. 1232 (M.D. La. 1975).
Thomas v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 392 F. Supp. 373 (N.D. Tex. 1975).
Roberts v. General Mills, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 1055 (N.D. Ohio 1971). 7th Circuit
Bujel v. Borman Food Stores, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 141 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
Barker v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 549 F.2d 400 (6th Cir. 1977).
Bedker v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 491 N.W.2d 275 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).
Keys v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 357 F. Supp. 376 (N.D. Ill. 1973). 8th Circuit
Indiana Civil Rights Comm'n v. Sutherland Lumber, 394 N.E.2d 949 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979).
Jahns v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 391 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. Mo. 1975). 9th Circuit
Knott v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 389 F. Supp. 856 (E.D. Mo. 1975).
Knott v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 527 F.2d 1249 (8th Cir. 1975).
Wamsganz v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 391 F. Supp. 306 (E.D. Mo. 1975).
Miller v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 410 F. Supp. 533 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
Hearth v. Metropolitan Transit Comm'n, 436 F. Supp. 685 (D. Minn. 1977).
Aros v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 348 F. Supp. 661 (C.D. Cal. 1972). 11th Circuit
Donohue v. Shoe Corp. of America, 337 F. Supp. 1357 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
Baker v. California Land Title Co., 349 F. Supp. 235 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
Baker v. California Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1974).
Albertson's, Inc. v. Washington State Human Rights Comm'n, 544 P.2d 98 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976).
Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'g Co., 352 F. Supp. 1018 (M.D. Ga. 1972).
EEOC v. Sambo's of Georgia, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 86 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
Relating to pre-conviction (jail) and post-conviction (prison) evnironments
In this table of cases, case citations are listed first as classification (i.e., jail, prison), then by circuit then in order of date - oldest to most recent. State court cases are placed within their respective federal circuit; immediately above each state case name is the name of its respective state. Note that within each circuit, the federal cases are listed first, then the list of state cases is presented. Pre-Trial Detention (jail)
Abbreviations the meanings of which may not be obvious are as follows:
Naz = Nazirite
Ras = Rastafarian
AITM = American Indigenous Tribal Member.
Parenthetical entries found after each citation relate, directly or indirectly, to the basis for the prisoner/plaintiff's complaint. For example, Naz. indicates the prisoner complained of a violation of his right to the free exercise of his religious practice, which was that of the Nazirite. Liberty indicates that the basis for the complaint was a violation of the prisoner's constitutionally protected liberty interest.
Boxed case citations relate to federal circuit court cases. Unpublished cases are identified as such.
1st Circuit Post-Trial Detention (prison)
Smith v. Sampson, 349 F. Supp. 268 (D. N.H. 1972). (Misc). 2nd Circuit
New York 4th Circuit
People v. Krueger, 306 N.Y.S.2d 359 (Sup. Ct. 1969). (Islam).
Christman v. Skinner, 323 N.Y.S.2d 767 (Sup. Ct. 1971). (Misc).
People v. Vega, 51 A.D.2d 33 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976). (Misc).
Virginia 10th Circuit
Palmer v. Virginia, 416 S.E.2d 52 (Va. Ct. App. 1992). (Misc).
United States v. Lamb, 575 F.2d 1310 (10th Cir. 1978). (Misc).
Goulden v. Oliver, 442 U.S. 922 (1979). (Jew). DC Circuit
None. 1st Circuit
None. 2nd Circuit
Sostre v. Preiser, 519 F.2d 763 (2nd Cir. 1975). (Misc). 3rd Circuit
Maguire v. Wilkinson, 405 F. Supp. 637 (D. Conn. 1975). (Naz).
Burgin v. Henderson, 536 F.2d 501 (2nd Cir. 1976). (Islam, Sunni).
Monroe v. Bombard, 422 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). (Islam, Sunni).
Moskowitz v. Wilkinson, 432 F. Supp. 947 (D. Conn. 1977). (Jew).
Phillips v. Coughlin, 586 F. Supp. 1281 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). (Ras).
Fromer v. Scully, 874 F.2d 69 (2nd Cir. 1989). (Jew).
Benjamin v. Coughlin, 905 F.2d 571 (2nd Cir. 1990). (Ras).
New York Solomon v. Coughlin, III, 456 N.Y.S.2d 125 (Sup. Ct. 1982). (AITM).
Overton v. Dept. of Correct'l Services, 499 N.Y.S.2d 860 (Sup. Ct. 1986). (Ras).
Poe v. Werner, 386 F. Supp. 1014 (M.D. Penn. 1974). (Misc.). 4th Circuit
Dreibelbis v. Marks, 675 F.2d 579 (3rd Cir. 1982). (Religion)
Dreibelbis v. Marks, 742 F.2d 792 (3rd Cir. 1984). (Religion).
Cole v. Flick, 758 F.2d 124 (3rd Cir. 1985). (AITM).
Wilson v. Schillinger, 761 F.2d 921 (3rd Cir. 1985). (Ras).
Collins v. Haga, 373 F. Supp. 923 (W.D. Va. 1974). (Misc). 5th Circuit
Williams v. Batton, 342 F. Supp. 1110 (E.D.N.C. 1972). (Religion).
Howard v. Hogan, 348 F. Supp. 1204 (E.D. Va. 1972). (Liberty).
Gallahan v. Hollyfield, 670 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1982). (AITM).
Brown v. Wainwright, 419 F.2d 1376 (5th Cir. 1970). (Religion). 6th Circuit
Brooks v. Wainwright, 428 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1970). (Religion).
Hill v. Estelle, 537 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1976). (Gender).
Shabazz v. Barnauskas, 598 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1979). (Islam).
Scott v. Mississippi Dept. of Corrections, 961 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1992). (Ras).
Diaz v. Collins, 872 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. Tex. 1994). (AITM).
Lewis v. Scott, 910 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. Tex. 1995). (Islam).
Hicks v. Garner, 69 F.3d 22 (5th Cir. 1995). (Ras). TEXAS
Morris v. Collins, 916 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. App. 1995). (Liberty).
Weaver v. Jago, 675 F.2d 116 (6th Cir. 1982). (AITM). 7th Circuit
Abdol-Rashaad v. Seiter, 690 F. Supp. 598 (S.D. Ohio 1987). (Estab. Clause).
McCoy v. Celeste, 836 F.2d 1348 (6th Cir. 1988). (Unpublished) (Naz).
Pollock v. Marshall, 845 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1988). (AITM).
Wellmaker v. Dahill, 836 F. Supp. 1375 (N.D. Ohio 1993). (Islam/Hebrew).
Phipps v. Parker, 879 F. Supp. 734 (W.D. Kentucky 1995). (Jew).
Estep v. Dent, 914 F. Supp. 1462 (W.D. Kentucky 1996). (Jew).
Davie v. Wingard, 958 F. Supp. 1244 (S.D. Ohio 1997).(Naz/Gender).
Ohio Dillon v. Russell, 621 N.E.2d 491 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).(Naz).
Reed v. Faulkner, 842 F.2d 960 (7th Cir. 1987). (Ras). 8th Circuit
Blake v. Pryse, 444 F.2d 218 (8th Cir. 1971). (Liberty). 9th Circuit
Ralls v. Wolfe, 448 F.2d 778 (8th Cir. 1971). (Liberty).
United States v. Aaron, 350 F. Supp. 1 (D. Minn. 1972). (AITM).
Rinehart v. Brewer, 491 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1974). (Religion, Liberty).
Proffitt v. Ciccone, 506 F.2d 1020 (8th Cir. 1974). (Naz?).
Teterud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975). (AITM).
Iron Eyes v. Henry, 907 F.2d 810 (8th Cir. 1990). (AITM).
Kemp v. Moore, 946 F.2d 588 (8th Cir. 1991). (AITM).
Campbell v. Purkett, 957 F.2d 535 (8th Cir. 1992). (Naz).
Sours v. Long, 978 F.2d 1086 (8th Cir. 1992). (Naz).
Quinn v. Nix, 983 F.2d 115 (8th Cir. 1993). (Liberty).
Bettis v. Delo, 14 F.3d 22 (8th Cir. 1994). (AITM).
Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545 (8th Cir. 1996). (AITM).
Missouri Adams v. Moore, 861 S.W.2d 680 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993). (AITM).
Winsby v. Walsh, 321 F. Supp. 523 (C.D. Calif. 1971). (Misc). 10th Circuit
Daugherty v. Reagan, 446 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1971). (Misc).
Capoeman v. Reed, 754 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1984). (AITM).
McCabe v. Arave, 626 F. Supp. 1199 (D. Idaho 1986). (Christian).
McCabe v. Arave, 827 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1987). (Christian).
Swift v. Lewis, 901 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1990). (Naz).
Friedman v. State of Arizona, 912 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1990). (Jew).
Wright v. Lewis, 927 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1991). (Unpublished) (Ras/Naz).
Swift v. Lewis, 17 F.3d 396 (9th Cir. 1993). (Unpublished) (Christian/Naz).
Belgard v. State of Hawaii, 883 F. Supp. 510 (D. Hawaii 1995). (AITM).
Abordo v. State of Hawaii, 902 F. Supp. 1220 (D. Hawaii 1995). (AITM).
Abordo v. State of Hawaii, 938 F. Supp. 656 (D. Hawaii 1996). (AITM).
Idaho Wilson v. Idaho, 746 P.2d 1022 (Idaho CT. App. 1987). (Free Expression).
Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106 (10th Cir. 1991). (AITM). 11th Circuit
Mosier v. Maynard, 937 F.2d 1521 (10th Cir. 1991). (AITM).
Perry v. Davies, 757 F. Supp. 1223 (D. Kan. 1991). (Religion).
Wright v. Raines, 457 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Kan. 1978). (Sikh).
Roseborough v. Scott, 875 P.2d 1160 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994). (Naz).
Harris v. Dugger, 715 F. Supp. 364 (S.D. Fla. 1989). (Ras).
Harris v. Dugger, 757 F. Supp. 1359 (S.D. Fla. 1991). (Ras).
Harris v. Chapman, 97 F.3d 499 (11th Cir. 1996). (Ras).
Brightly v. Wainwright, 814 F.2d 612 (11th Cir. 1987). (Religion).
Solomon v. Zant, 888 F.2d 1579 (11th Cir. 1987). (Misc).
Shabazz v. Barnauskas, 600 F. Supp. 712 (M.D. Fla. 1985). (Islam).
Furqan v. Georgia, 554 F. Supp. 873 (N.D. Ga. 1982). (Islam, Sunni).